

Notes on the Surrender

2 May

1. BLUMENTRITT - comdg forces between Baltic and WESER - sent in to say he would come in at 1100 hrs 3 May to surrender his forces.

3 May

2. Blumentritt did not come; said the thing was above his level.
Instead, following came to my Tac HQ at 1200 hrs;

2. Bismarck did not come; said the thing was above his level.

Instead, following came to my Tac HQ at 1200 hrs;

General Admiral Von Friedeberg:
C-in-C German Navy.

General Künzel: C of S to C-in-C West
Field-Marshal BUSCH.

Rear-Admiral Wagner: Staff Officer to
Friedeberg.
L.O. between him + OKW.

Major FREIDEL: Staff Officer to KUNSEL.

These had been sent by Field Marshal Kretschmer, and brought a letter saying they had full power to discuss military matters with me.

3. I asked them what they wanted.
 They said they wanted to ask me to accept the surrender of the three German armies now withdrawing in front of the Russians in Mecklenburg, on my eastern flank.
 I refused.

4. They then said they were anxious about the civil population in that area.
 I said it was not in my area and they must deal with the Russians about it.

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5. I then asked if they wanted to discuss the surrender of their forces on my northern flank.

They said no.

But they were anxious about the civilians in those areas and wanted to arrange with me some scheme by which they could withdraw slowly as I advanced.

I refused.

6. I then said they must understand that I refused to discuss any matters connected with the situation on my eastern flank between WISMAR and DOMITZ. They must approach the Russians.

7. As regards my northern flank there were three points:

(a) They must surrender to me unconditionally, all German forces in Holland, NW Germany including the Frisian Islands and Heligoland, Schleswig Holstein,

(a) They must surrender to me unconditionally, all German forces in Holland, NW Germany, including the Frisian Islands, and Heligoland, Schleswig Holstein, and Denmark.

(b) Once this was done I would discuss with them all details as regards the occupation of areas, care of civilians, etc, etc.

(c) If (a) was not agreed, then I would continue fighting, and would be glad to do so.

This was in effect a tactical surrender of the forces immediately opposing me, and those in support.

8. ⇒ They showed them a map which gave the battle situation on the western front. They had no idea what this was, and were very upset.

von Friedeberg went while he was having lunch.

⇒ Shepherd gave them lunch in a tent, alone, by themselves.

9. After lunch I sent for them again.

They said they had no powers to agree to my demands vide para 7(a).

9. After lunch I sent for them again. They said they had no powers to agree to my demands side para 7(a). But two of them would go back to OKW, see Kretzel, and bring back his agreement.

Van Friedeberg & Freider went back; they were escorted through Hamburg and into the German lines by RT. Col Warren, my P.A.

Kretzel and Wagner stayed at my HQ.

10. It must be clearly understood that I
am ^{arranging} ~~have~~ ~~arranged~~ the tactical surrender of
the forces immediately opposing my armies,
and those forces in support in
Denmark.

Anything bigger than this would require
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4 May

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4 May

11. Von Frideberg returned at 1800 hrs.
At 1830 hrs the German delegation signed the terms.

Col POLKE returned with Von Frideberg, and signed with the others.

B. H. Montgomery
Field-Marshal